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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
HENRY HUMMEL and MABEL D. 
HUMMEL, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
WILLIAM YOUNG and MAUD M. 
YOUNG, his wife, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 7849 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEl\IENT OF CASE 
The respmadents by their complaint (R. 3) claimed the 
ownership of the property located at 926 Springville Road 
in Provo, Utah, and that the appellants owned property ad-
joining them on the North. Respondents complained fur-
ther that appellants had trespassed on their ground by build-
ing a fence South of the appellants' deeded property line and 
had enclosed behind that fence a portion of the respondents' 
land; that the respondents discovered the trespass by a re-
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cent survey of these properties and notified appellants and 
began moving the fence back to the true deeded boundary 
line; and that appellants threatened to do violence if re-
spondents moved the fence and refused to permit them to 
do so. The respondents sought an injunction, damages, and 
to have their title quieted. The appellants in their answer 
(R. 8) generally denied that they had trespassed upon the 
respondents' ground and set up several defenses to respond-
ents' claim: (1) The seven-year statute of limitations 
and adverse possession of the ground behind their fence 
for more than the statutory period, (2) that the fence in 
question was built in 1928 as a result of a settlement of dis-
pute between appellant William Young and A. H. LeVitre 
and L~dia C. LeVitre, predecessors of respondents, over 
the boundary between their properties, (3) that appellants 
cultivated and occ4pied all of the land up to the fence since 
it was built from the North, and that respondents and pre-
. decessors have done likewise on the South side, and (4) 
that the parties have at all times since the fence was built 
treated it as the boundary between their properties and 
that it was located as such boundary. A trial was had be-
fore the court, sitting without a jury, in which the issues 
raised by the pleadings were resolved against defendants 
and judgment given for plaintiffs. From this judgment ap-
pellants appeal . 
STATEl\'IENT OF FACTS 
We cannot agree entirely with counsel's "Statement of 
Facts" as set forth in appellants' brief. There is no citation 
to the record in the brief. We prefer to state the facts fully 
and cite the record in support of same. The respondents 
by Warranty Deed acquired the premises described in para-
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graph 2 of count one of their complaint on April 27, 1945, 
and same is identified on their Exhibit '' J" as Tract 2 (R. 
106), and contains 1 acre of land together with improve-
ments thereon. The appellants own the premises adjoining 
the respondents on the North containing 1.04 acres of land, 
together with improvements, the same being designated as 
Tract 1 on plaintiffs' Exhibit "J'', appellant William Young 
having acquired the same by Warranty Deed from one 
Cavel in about the year 1925 (D. Ex. 1-R. 106). There is 
a presently existing wire division fence between the respec-
tive properties of the parties, but the same is not on the 
boundary line described in their respective deeds (Tr. 19). 
This wire fence was built by the appellant, William Young, 
probably in 1928 (Tr. 46-7), while Lydia C. LeVitre was the 
record owner of the resspondents' premises. The respond-
ents caused a survey of their property, as well as that of 
the appellants, to be made in September of 1950, and the 
same shows that the division fence encroaches upon respond-
ents' land along the North side thereof about 6 feet on the 
East end and 10.9 feet on the West end and deprives re-
spondents of about .08 of an acre of their ground which is 
enclosed on appellants' side of the fence (Tr. 18-20). 
For several weeks before the fence was built the ap-
pellant William Young was being damaged by the trespas-
sing cows and horses of one Chris Peterson, who was the 
owner of the parcel of land adjoining that of the respond-
ents on the South, which was designated as Tract 3 of the 
plat, plaintiffs' Exhibit ''J" (Tr. 46-47). The fence was built 
pursuant to an arrangement between the appellant William 
Young and Chris Peterson, whereby the latter furnished the 
post and wire and the former built the fence (Tr. 47). The 
fence was put on a line appellants claim was designated by 
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A. H. LeVitre shortly before the fence was built in 1928 
(Tr. 49). A. H. LeVitre had conveyed respondents' prop-
erty (Tract 2) on May 8, 1924, to Lydia C. LeVitre, some 
4 years prior to the fence being built (Tr. 42). Neither A. 
H. LeVitre nor Lydia C. LeVitre lived on Tract 2 at the time 
the fence was built (Tr. 59-60). 
The appellant, William Young, testified that he always 
thought he had built the fence in question on his true deeded 
line, and never knew any different until the respondents 
had the survey made in September, 1950. The appellant, 
William Young, testified as to what land he claimed after 
he acquired Tract 1 in 1925, as follows (Tr. 69-70): 
"Q. Now when you acquired your property in 1925, 
what property did you intend to claim? 
A. Property I intended to claim? 
Q. Yes. 
A.' One and four-hundredths acres ,of course. 
Q. And that was the property described in your 
deed? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did you ever intend to claim more property 
than was described in your deed? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you ever intend to claim any land not de-
scribed in your own deed? At that time? 
A. Why, no I didn't. Why should I? 
Q. Did you ever intend to claim any land de-
scribed in your neighbor's deed on the south? 
A. No, I didn't. , 
Q. The only land that you ever did intend to 
claim, or ever have claimed, was the land described in 
your deed; is that correct? 
A. Yes." 
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Although upon being questioned by his counsel after 
the above evidence was adduced from him on cross-examin-
ation, the appellant, William Young, further testified as 
follows (Tr. 72) : 
"Q. Have you ever intended to claim less property 
than that which is enclosed by the fences there at the 
present time? 
A. No sir. 
Q. You intend to claim all that's inside the fen-
ces? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. So that when you said that you intend to claim 
only the described property, you understood that the 
described property was inside the fences? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. The fences enclosing that described property? 
A. Yes sir. Just what is in there. One and four-
hundredths acres. 
Q. So when you say that you intended only to 
claim the property described by your deed, that is what 
you think is enclosed by the fence? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you have intended to claim all that's in-
side the fence? 
A. Yes sir." 
But on re-cross-examination the appellant finally testi-
fide on this matter as follows (Tr. 74): 
"Q. Now of course your claim is that the fence en-
closed only the property that was described in your 
deed; isn't that right? 
A. Yes." 
Thus, the appellant shows no adverse claim to plain-
tiffs' .08 acre piece of land that lays behind the fence he 
had built in 1928. 
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Appellants claimed in their answer that (R. 9): 
". . . the fence . . . . was built in the 
spring of 1928 as a result of the settlement of a dispute 
as to the location of the boundary between William 
Young, and A. H. LeVitre ad Lydia C .LeVitre, the 
plaintiffs' predecessors in title, and that said fence was 
built as the boundary between the property of defend-
ants and the property of plaintiffs' predecessors;" 
But the appellants failed to adduce any evidence to sup-
port this claim. In this connection the defendant, William 
Young, testified as follows (Tr. 65-67): 
"So that there was never any dispute between you 
and LeVitre about where the boundary line between 
you was? 
A. No sir. 
Q. That is your north line and his south line? 
A. Yes. My south line is his north line. 
Q. Your south line is his north line? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say there wasn't any dispute about that? 
A. No. 
Q. You had your deed to yours? 
A. Yes, one and four-hundredths acres, that's all. 
Q. And he had his deed to his? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You both bought from the same people, didn't 
you? 
A. No. LeVitre sold to Cavell and Cavell sold 
to me. 
Q. When was the first time anything came up 
about the boundary line between you and Mr. LeVitre? 
A. We never ·had anything about the boundary 
line between LeVitre and I. Never had any trouble 
about it until now. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Did you ever make any agreement about it? 
A. No. 
Q. No agreement about it? 
A. No agreement, no. 
Q. ·Did you ever discuss it with LeVitre? 
A. Yes. When first moved there he used to 
come around when I was building chicken houses and 
talk around. We were pretty good friends, I thought. 
Q. I mean did you ever discuss the matter of 
this boundary with him? 
A.. Yes, but wouldn't discuss it every day. 
Q. You never had any differences ahout it? 
A. No. 
Q. Never any dispute about it? 
A. No. 
Q. There was never any uncertainty about it 
at all? 
A. No. 
Q. And of course there was no agreement be-
tween you and LeVitre concerning it? 
A. Not any more than told us where it was, and 
told me where the points were, and that's where I put 
the fence. 
Q. Now tell us about that. 
A. That's all there is to tell. 
Q. I mean these points that you mentioend. 
A. Well, showed me where they were, a big tree 
on one side and had a mark on the fence at the bot-
tom on the other. 
Q. Did he tell you at that time that a survey 
had been made? 
A. A what had been made? 
Q. A survey had been made? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Hie told you at that Ume? 
A. Yes. 
Q. About when was that? 
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A. Oh, along in '25, after I bought the place. 
Q. 1925? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was never any written agreement be-
tween you and Mr. La Vitre? 
A. No. 
Q. You say there was no occasion for it? 
A. No, not that I know of. 
Q. No dispute or any uncertainty as to where 
the line was? 
A. No." 
There is no evidence that Lydia C. Le Vitre or A. H. 
UeVitre acquiesced in the fence as the boundary between 
Tract 1 and Tract 2 after same was built by appellant Wil-
liam Young in 1928. The record shows that the LeVitres 
had moved away from Tract 2 (Tr. 59-60) and perhaps 
did not know the fence had been built. The evidence is 
that Ernest Farrer acquired title to Tract 2 by Warranty 
Deed on August 24, 1936, from Lydia C. LeVitre (Tr. 42) 
and conveyed it away to one William 0. McMeen and wife 
on September 15, 1944 (Tr. 43), but there is no evidence 
whatsoever that Ernest Farrer ever recognized or acqui-
esced in the fence as the boundary between Tract 1 and 
Tract 2, and the record is silent as to any acquiescence on 
the part of McMeen for the year he owned Tract 2 before 
conveying same to the plaintiff on April 27, .1945. The 
record positively shows that respondents did not recognize 
the ~ence as the boundary line between their property and 
appellants' property. They caused the survey to be made 
in September, 1950, (Tr. 6 and 18) well within 7 years 
after they took possession, and upon discovery that appel-
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!ants' fence was encroaching on their property, took steps 
to put the fence on the deeded line that resulted in this 
lawsuit (Tr. 7-11). The record further discloses that upon 
demand by respondents, the Gas Company permitted plain-
tiffs to move the fence North to the deeded line in connec-
tion with the piece of Tract 1 that had previously been con-
veyed to it by appellants (Tr. 9). 
The most that can be said on this record in support 
of appellants' claimed acquiescence theory is that appellant 
Wiliam Young built the fence in question in 1928 in order 
to protect his gardens from the trespassing animals of 
Chris Peterson, and that the fence has remained where it 
was built dividing Tract 1 and Tract 2 ever since. 
There is no evidence that the appellants have ever 
paid any taxes whatsoever on the .08 of an acre in dispute 
in this lawsuit, and the record positively shows that the 
respondents and their predecessors have always paid the 
taxes thereon (Tr. 5) (R. 106). 
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS 
I. APPELLANTS' APPEAL RAISES ONLY THE 
QUESTION AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVI-
DENCE TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT 
"APPELLANTS OCCUPY ANY OF RESPONDENTS' 
LAND.'' 
II. THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
MAKING THE FINDINGS HEREIN OR IN THE AP-
PLICATION OF THE LAW THERTO. 
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APPELLANTS' APPEAL RAISES ONLY THE 
QUESTION AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVI-
DENCE TO SUST.MN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT 
''APPELLANTS OCCUPY ANY OF RESPONDENTS' 
LAND.'' 
Utah Rules of Ovil Procedure, Rule 52{b), provides 
as follows: 
"Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 
days after entry of judgment the court may amend 
its findings or make additional findings and may amend 
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. 
·When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the 
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter 
be raised whether or not the party raising the ques-
tion has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, 
a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial." 
Under this rule appellants had a right to move the 
court for an amendment of or additional findings. This 
they failed to do. They were not thereby precluded from 
thereafter raising a "question of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the findings." But it would seem that 
appellants are thereby precluded from raising any question 
as to the court's failure to make additional findings. Es-
pecially is this true since the court made findings on all 
issues raised by the pleadings. Points I and II made by 
appellants in their brief are based on alleged error in fail-
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ing to make findings and therefore they are not before the 
court on this appeal. 
Appellants' Point III assails the court's finding that 
"the appellants occupy any of the respondents' land" upon 
the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support same. 
Evidently counsel refers to finding 4 (R. 12), which is as 
follows: 
"That the defendants have trespassed upon and 
taken a portion of the plaintiffs' above described land 
on the North side thereof by constructing a fence 
thereon South of defendants' boundary line and en-
closing said portion of plaintiffs' land behind said 
fence unlawfully and in violation of the plaintiffs' own-
ership of their above described lands." 
The argument is that the surveyor did not take into 
account the overages in section 7, where the land in con-
troversy lies . Appellants' counsel seems to say that there 
was uncertainty affecting the survey of the appellants' and 
respondents' lands (Tract 1 and Tract 2-Ex. J) because 
the surveyor failed to consider the overages of section 7 
when he surveyed it. That this is not the record is shown 
by the surveyor's final words on the matter (Tr. 36-37) 
as follows by Mr. Ballif on redirect: 
''Q. Now you were acquainted at the time you 
made the survey with the discrepancies in Section 7? 
A. Yes, I have the actual measured distance be-
tween every section corner that there is record of in 
the County . 
Q. And in making this survey, you took that 
discrepancy into consideration·? 
A. I did. 
Q. And you determined that the property to the 
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south, the Peterson property had been surveyed. And 
did your survey concide with that? 
A. I did not determine that the Peterson prop-
erty had been surveyed by actual information as to 
who it had been done by, but I assumed it had been 
surveyed because of the fact that my findings on the 
ground actually checked with the 'boundary line in 
their description. 
Q. So that you found the south fence of Hum-
mels' substantially on the deeded description line? 
A. It is on the Peterson deed, not the Hummel." 
The testimony of the surveyor (Tr. 17-41) amply sus-
tains the assailed finding. Indeed there is no evidence in 
the record to the contrary. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN MAK-
ING THE FINDINGS HEREIN OR IN THE APPLICA-
TION OF THE LAW THERETO. 
In our Statement of Facts, supra, we cited appellants' 
testimony to show that the fence in question was not built 
pursuant to an agreement between him and LeVitre. But 
counsel in appellants' brief makes the unsupported claim 
that there was such an agreement (Br. of A 11 and 12). 
Another claim made by counsel which the evidence fails 
to support is that "respondents and their predecessors cul-
tivated and used the land . . . to the fence . . ." 
The fact is LeVitre ,the common prodecessor to both par-
ties, never cultivated or used the land in question (Tr. 58). 
There is no evidence that LeVitre built sheds or a garage 
along the South side of the said fence (Tr. 51). The orchard 
on appellants' side of the fence was planted only five years 
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ago (Tr. 61) and these trees are North of the deeded boun-
dary line and on appellants' deeded land (Tr. 63). With 
these corrections our statement of the facts reflects the 
record in this case. The record amply sustains the court's 
findings. It is our position that the conclusions and judg-
ment follow the law applicable to this factual situation. 
At the trial respondents claimed the true boundary 
between Tracts 1 and 2 (Ex. J) to be the deeded line, and 
appellants claimed it was the fence. Appellants based 
their claim upon three grounds: (1)the statute of limita-
tions and adverse possession for more than 7 years, (2) 
that the predecessors of both parties made an oral agree-
ment as to the disputed boundary line pursuant to which 
the fence was built, and (3) that respondents' predecessors 
have acquiesced in the fence as the boundary since the 
same was built in 1928 . Appellants failed to adduce evi-
dence sustaining either of these claims, and the court so 
found. 
We believe that the law governing this case is estab-
lished by Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 267 P. 912. In that 
case the plaintiff held the title to a piece of land. Defend-
ant held the record title to an adjoining parcel. Both of 
these parties were on the land prior to patent. An irregu-
lar fence was put up by the plaintiff's predecessor in title 
in the year 1870 to enclose land to be used for garden pur-
poses . Later on defendant's predecessor in title came on 
the land and same was used jointly by them. Subsequently 
a survey was made and the boundary line between the 
properties in question was established. This boundary line 
showed record title to the disputed land to be in plaintiff's 
predecessor . The fence line was not changed and the par-
ties went ahead using the land jointly for vegetable gar-
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dens. Plaintiff brought action in 1922 claiming the own-
ership of the land. The trial court found for the defend-
ant on the theory that the fence boundary had been acqui-
esced in for a long period of time. On appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision, holding that the title to the 
land behind the survey line fence still rested in the plain-
tiff. 
In this case the defendant endeavored to establish 
title to the disputed land (1) hy adverse possession, (2) 
by oral agreement that the fence should be the boundary 
line, and (3) that the parties and their predecessors had 
acquiesced in the boundary for a long period of time. 
These are substantially the claims made b)' the defend-
ants in the case at bar. On each of these contentions the 
court held against the defendant and had the following 
to say: 
"It is clear that defendants have failed to establish 
title to the land in controversy by adverse possession, 
because neither they nor their predecessors in title 
ever paid any taxes thereon. 
". . . . It is therefore clear that defendants' claim 
to the land in controversy must stand or fall either 
upon an express agreement fixing the boundary line, 
or upon acquiescence in a boundary line .between the 
land owned by plaintiff and that owned by defend-
ants. 
"So far as length of time is concerned, the fence 
claimed by defendants as marking the boundary line 
has been established for a sufficiently long period to 
support defendants' claim. 11i was erected in about 
the year 1870 ,and, according to the testimony of de-
fendants, it has remaind in the same location until 
this suit was begun in 1922. According to the rule 
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laid down by the textwriters and practically all of the 
adjudicated cases where the question is discussed, one 
of the requisites necessary to the establishment of a 
boundary line other than the true boundary line be-
tween adjoining landowners by oral agreement or 
acquiescence, in the absence of adverse possession or 
estoppel, is that the location of the true boundary 
sought to be thus established is or has been uncertain 
or in dispute . . . . . " 
The record in the instant case shows that the LeVitres 
had moved away from the premises before appellants built 
the fence in question and perhaps knew nothing of it.. It 
further conclusively appears that there was no uncertainty 
as to the boundary even when LeVitre owned Tract 2t 
some four years before appellant Young built th~ fence. 
And the record further discloses that there was no agree-
ment, oral or written, between appellants and Lydia C. 
LeVitre nor A. H. LeVitre, her husband, that the fence 
should be built where same was built in 1928 or that it 
should be the boundary between Tract 1 and Tract 2 (Ex. 
J). The most that can be sustained from the evidence is 
that shortly before appellant Young built the fence in 1928 
A. H. LeVitre, who was then a stranger to the title of Tract 
2, designated where the fence should be by referring to a 
tree and a back fence . The conclusion is inescapable that 
the fence in question never was intended as a boundary 
when it was built. It was erected to keep Petersons live-
stock from damaging appellants' garden. 
Brown v. Millner, (1951) 232 P2d, 202, is one of the 
very recent utterances of the Utah Supreme Court on the 
question of boundary disputes . It involved a disputed 
tract of land in Summit County. Appellant claimed title 
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to the land in dispute under a deed while the respondent 
claims title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
and by adverse possession. Appellant appealed from a 
judgment quieting title to the disputed area in the respond-
ent and the holding of the lower court was reversed with 
directions to enter judgment in favor of the appellant. The 
court refused to apply the doctrine of ''boundary by acqui-
escence" contended for by respondent, and said: 
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary 
disputes reveals that it has long been recoginzed in 
this state that when the location of the true boundary 
between two adjoining tracts of land is unknown, un-
certain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol 
agreement, establish the boundary line and thereby 
irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees. Ry-
dalch v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107 P. 25; Tripp v. Bag-
ley, 74 Utah 57, 267 P. 912. In the latter case this 
court pointed out that when the location of the true 
boundary is known to the adjoining owners any parol 
agreement between them establishing the boundary 
elsewhere would be an attempt to transfer an interest 
in realty without complying with the statute of frauds. 
But, we stated, if the location of the true boundary is 
not known to the adjoining owners, a parol agreement 
between them fixing its location is not regarded as 
transferring an interest in land but merely determin-
ing the location of existing estates. 
"We have further held in this state that in the 
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining prop-
erty or their predecessors in interest ever expressly 
agreed as to the location of the boundary between 
them, if they have occupied their respective premises 
up to an open boundary line visibly marked by monu-
ments, fences or buildings for a long period of time 
and mutually recognized it as the dividing line between 
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them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boun-
dary as located, if it can do so consistently with the 
facts appearing, and. will not permit the parties nor 
their grantees to depart from such line. Holmes v. 
Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009. . However 
in that case we were careful to mark off the limits of 
the rule. Said the court: 
'We do not wish to be understood as holding 
that the parties may not claim to the true boun-
dary, where an assumed or agreed boundary is 
located through mistake or inadvertence, or 
where it is clear that the line as located was not 
intended as a boundary, and where a botmdary 
so located has not been acquiesced in for a long 
term of years by the parties in interest.' 
" . Does the fence which was constructed 
constructed by the defendant in the old channel con-
stitute a boundary line from which the parties may 
not now depart? That question must be answered 
in the negative. No claim is made by the defendant 
that he erected the fence pursuant to an express agree-
ment with the plaintiff's father, who was then the 
owner of tract #1, as to where the boundary should 
be located. Nor can it be implied that such an agree-
ment ever took place as in Holmes v. Judge, supra, 
and the cases following it cited above. The defend-
ant, who personally built the fence, does not contend 
that he ever as much as had a discussion with the 
plaintiff or his father concerning the location of the 
boundary between them. He testified, and his wife 
corroborated him, that when he had finished build-
ing the fence the plaintiff came along and inquired 
what he (the defendant) was doing and that nothing 
more was said. Were the record silent as to the 
circumstances surrounding the erection of the fence 
there might be room to imply that it was built in pur-
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suance of an agreement between the adjoining owners 
as to the location of the boundary between them, such 
as was done in Holmes v. Judge, supra. But in the 
instant case, as in Peterson v. Johnson, supra; Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation v. !Dudley, supra; and Glenn 
v. Whitney, supra, there is no room under the evidence 
for such an implication to be drawn. Thus we con-
clude that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
has no application under the evidence." 
Neither is there any room for the doctrine of Brown 
v. Millner to be applied to the facts of the case at bar. 
There was no agreement on the part of Lydia C. LeVitre 
that the appellant should build the fence when or where 
it was built. Both she and her husband, A. H. LeVitre, had 
moved away from Tract 2 before the fence was built and 
had no knowledge of it. There is no evidence that Ernest 
Farrer, who acquired title to Tract 2 from Lydia C. 
LeVitre, or William 0. McMeen, who acquired title to same 
from Farrer, ever lived on the property or knew of the 
fence, let alone acquiescing in same as the boundary. The 
record shows positively that respondents never acquiesced 
in the fence as the boundary for the 7 year period estab-
lished by Ekburg v. Bates, 239 P2d 205. They acquired 
the property April 27, 1945, and caused the survey to be 
made in September, 1950, which resulted in this lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the court are amply sustained by the 
evidence, and upon the record and the law the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE S. BALLIF, 
Attorney for Respondents 
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